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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 02-3717
____________
KELLY M .; MICHELLE M.;
HARRY O.
v.
LUZERNE INTERMEDIATE UNIT;
KEVIN O'CONNOR, Individually
and in his capacity as the
executive director of the Luzerne
Intermediate Unit.; LEONARD
JERRYTONE; SANDY OSTROSKI

Leonard Jerrytone,
Appellant
____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. No. 3: CV-00-0761
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 15, 2003
Before: McKEE, BARRY, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 25, 2003 )

____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves a default judgment entered in the United Stated District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Leonard Jerrytone, a teacher in the
Luzerne Intermediate Unit, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs sued Jerrytone
alleging that he sexually harassed Kelly M., one of his students. On March 27, 2001, the
District Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs against Jerrytone in the amount of
$40,000. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. On April 6, 2001, defendant filed a Motion to Open
and/or Strike Default Judgment, Motion for a New Trial or in the Alternative for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The District Court heard the motion on October
15, 2001, took testimony, and denied the motion by order dated November 26, 2001.
Defendant timely appealed. We affirm.1
I.
Plaintiffs properly mailed Jerrytone a summons and complaint on May 8, 2000,
but he did not accept informal service. Then, plaintiffs formally served him with the
complaint on August 8, 2000. He failed to respond. On October 26, 2000, counsel for
plaintiffs mailed a letter to Jerrytone’s residence informing him of counsel’s intention to
1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(4). The
District Court’s order dated November 26, 2001 is a final order for the purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
2

enter a default judgment against him and that a pretrial conference had been scheduled for
October 31, 2000 at 10:30 a.m. On November 30, 2000, plaintiffs mailed to Jerrytone
their motion for entry of default against him. On December 5, 2000, the clerk entered a
default against Jerrytone. On December 12, 2000, Jerrytone wrote a letter to the District
Court stating inter alia that the attorney he believed to have been representing him, Frank
Mazzeo, 2 had informed him that he was only representing him in the criminal
proceedings. (A 27-28.) Jerrytone also wrote in the letter that he needed legal assistance
and wanted to appeal the entry of default against him.3 Judge A. Richard Caputo promptly
responded in writing that he could not give legal advice and that Jerrytone should
“contact counsel for any legal assistance you believe you require.” (A 31.)
Jerrytone averred that, in response to Judge Caputo’s letter, he “took it up with
Mr. Mazzeo at that time” and “[Mazzeo] said he would take care of it.” (A 65). Jerrytone
later testified that he had been mistaken when he wrote to Judge Caputo on December 12,
2000 that Mazzeo was only handling the criminal matter. (A 71-72.) In fact, Mazzeo was
Jerrytone’s lawyer in the civil suit from its inception until January 18, 2002.
On January 9, 2001, plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment and served it
upon Jerrytone. On January 18, 2001, the District Court granted the motion for default
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Mazzeo is also Jerrytone’s cousin. (A 68.)

3

Jerrytone later averred that his December 12, 2000 letter to the court was an effort to
cover himself in case Mazzeo did not take care of the default. He wanted the court to
know that if the hearing went against him on the default because Mazzeo was not there,
he wanted to appeal. (A 71.)
3

judgment and scheduled a hearing on the amount of the judgment for February 26, 2001.
Jerrytone was served with the order. According to Jerrytone’s later testimony, he retained
Attorney Loftus on or before January 28, 2001. (A 71.) 4
Weighing the equities on a motion to vacate a default judgment and the need to
finally resolve controversies does not lend itself to a rigid formula or per se rule. Hritz v.
Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984). However, we generally disfavor
default judgments and resolve doubts as to whether a default judgment should be set aside
in favor of resolving the matter on the merits. See Zawadski de Bueno v. Bueno Castro,
822 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 1987). Several considerations go into this decision. First,
whether lifting the default judgment will prejudice the plaintiff. Second, whether the
defendant has a prima facie meritorious defense. Third, whether the defaulting
defendant’s conduct is excusable or culpable. Fourth, whether alternative sanctions would
be effective. See Emansco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1987).5
There is no prejudice in this case. As the District Court accurately explained, the
emotional strain of litigating an action on the merits is not the kind of prejudice towards
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Peter Loftus did not enter a formal appearance on behalf of Jerrytone until April 6,
2001. Jerrytone delivered a check in the amount of $5000 to Loftus sometime in April,
2001. Defendant now disputes his own testimony that he hired Loftus on January 28,
2001. (A 71.) The District Court did not err in crediting Jerrytone’s uncontradicted sworn
testimony, rather than Loftus’ subsequent unsupported arguments. (Dist. Ct. op. at 7-8.)
5

A District Court must make explicit findings concerning the factors it considered in
rendering the default judgment. Emansco, 834 F.2d at 74. Here, the District Court has
amply met this requirement.
4

which our jurisprudence is directed. (Dist. Ct. op. at 4-5.) Likewise, Jerrytone cursorily
claims that he has a meritorious defense, although he has not filed an answer to the
complaint or tendered one in his petition to set aside the default judgment. If proven,
Jerrytone’s claims of actual innocence would have precluded recovery by the plaintiffs.
Jerrytone’s conduct in failing to respond to the several personal notices he
received from plaintiffs’ counsel or to appear at several hearings was culpable. Neither
Jerrytone nor his attorney appeared at the February 26, 2001 hearing. His December 12,
2000 letter does not excuse his absence for two reasons. First, at that time, he was
represented by counsel. (A 71.) As the District Court found, there is no reason why Loftus
could not have appeared with Jerrytone at the February 26, 2001 hearing or sought to
reopen the judgment sooner. (Dist. Ct. op. at 7.) Second, Jerrytone was a school teacher,
not an illiterate dunce. Even if he had been pro se on February 26, 2001, he was properly
served with notice of the hearing and thus had the opportunity to appear on his own
behalf. (Dist. Ct. op. at 3.) Either way, his absence is culpable rather than excusable.
Plaintiffs presented testimonial evidence at the February 26, 2001 hearing. Obviously,
defendant did not present any evidence on his own behalf. The entire record of this case,
including defendant’s own sworn testimony, belies his arguments on appeal. 6
II.

6

Applying the fourth prong of the Emansco test, we do not conclude that alternative
sanctions would be preferable to affirming the denial of the motion to reopen and/or
strike the default judgment.
5

The District Court’s order dated November 26, 2001 denying appellant’s motion
to open and/or strike default judgment, motion for a new trial or in the alternative for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is hereby affirmed. Costs taxed against the
appellant.
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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.

/s/ Max Rosenn
Circuit Judge
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